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Introduction 
 
Transsexualism (also known as Gender Identity Disorder (GID), 
Transgenderism
2
, and Gender Dysphoria (GD)) represents a desire to live 
and be accepted as a member of another sex, usually accompanied by a 
sense of discomfort with one‟s anatomic sex and a wish to have hormonal 
treatment and surgery to make one‟s body as congruent as possible with 
the preferred sex. Within some sexological literature, genital reconstructive 
surgery is implicitly and explicitly emphasised as the most important 
factor and end point in the construction of a happy and satisfied 
Transsexual
3
 identity (Benjamin, 1966). A consequence of this 
                                                          
1 I am using the sex/gender concept to highlight the relationship between sexed 
bodies and gendered expressions of masculinity and femininity that are often 
conflated in the narratives of Transsexuals. 
2 The term Transgender is widely used now as an umbrella term, which may 
included a variety of people whose non-conforming gender identity positions defy 
the binary sex/gender system. Transgender has to do with living and understanding 
oneself outside of the current systems of gender. These can include Transvestite, 
cross-dressers, Transsexuals, drag queens, butches etc. Within my research and 
small sample of 24 transpeople from which this chapter is derived there is evidence 
that the Transgender label sits antagonistically with most of the respondents that 
were interviewed. The respondents explicitly requested to be know as either male 
or female or transmen or transwomen respectively.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
3 I have capitalised Transsexual/Transvestite/Transgender throughout this chapter 
to indicate the pathologisation inherent in the sexological nomenclatures. 
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concentration is that Transsexuals are constantly equated with genital 
surgery, which has implications for Transsexual authenticity or „true 
Transsexualism‟ as opposed to Transvestism (Benjamin, 1966), socially, 
in the clinician‟s office (May, 2002), Transgender studies (Roen, 2001), 
and Transgender politics (Califia, 1997). Furthermore, and probably more 
importantly for this chapter, the equation of genitals and surgery assumes 
pathology, at least in the eyes of the psychologists who are gatekeepers to 
the process of transitioning from female to male and vice versa. 
 The Transsexual experience, where the body is situated in conflict with 
gender identity, does not have the same socio-psychological and political 
implications as for example, transformative surgeries about “race” or age. 
The doctors, according to Wilton are, 
 
happy to take Michael Jackson‟s money for repeated plastic surgeries to 
make his appearance less “black” [without a] diagnosis of “transracialism” 
for white people trapped in black bodies. Similarly, although they will cut, 
inject, staple, peel and burn you to help you appear younger; there is no 
theory of the aetiology of “transaegism” to explain how such a young 
person came to be wrongfully imprisoned in an old person‟s body. Gender 
seems to be the only paradigm of difference within which the “self” is 
authoritatively permitted to be at odds with the “body”. (Wilton, 2000: 
242) 
 
Wilton argues that the desire to change gender attributes through aesthetic 
surgery is the only signifier of identity that endorses pathology from the 
medical authorities. In this chapter I will show that body modifications, 
whether permanent or temporary, are a well thought out and rational 
reflexive process, which are similar to the reflections that women reported 
while considering and undergoing aesthetic surgery in Kathy Davies 
(1994) empirical study. 
 Nevertheless, this reflexive process occurs within individual and 
cultural discourses of masculinity and femininity. My particular aim is to 
decentre the notion that changing bodily appearances through aesthetic, 
surgical or hormonal interventions are pathological narcissistic processes, 
which always see narcissism as a negative force. I will however, 
incorporate a reconstituted reading of narcissism as a concept to explicate 
the possible reasons why body modifications by way of hormones, surgery 
are desired processes for the Transsexual. In doing so, my interest is not 
with applying (oedipalised) psychoanalysis but to engage theoretically 
                                                                                                                        
However, I have left transmen/man, transwomen/man and transpeople un-
capitalised because most of the respondents referred to themselves in this way, 
suggesting their own subjective management. 
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with the notion of narcissism to argue against the pathologisation of the 
Transsexual subject and to add to our understanding of the psychosocial 
complexities of trans-gendering. 
 Freud (1927) suggests that the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego. A 
person‟s body is the preliminary place where perceptions are formulated 
within the psyche. Leaning on this notion, I aim to integrate narcissism 
and the psychoanalytic phenomenology of Eric Erikson (1950) to provide 
an understanding of embodiment and bodily aesthetics in which 
Transsexuality is re-produced positively and understood in non-
pathological terms. It is possible to explicate the processes that 
transpeople
4
 encounter and experience through a reworked concept of 
narcissism, from the initial and ongoing realisation that their bodies do not 
fit securely with their ego as well as the realisation that their expressions 
of masculinity or femininity neither fit with personal nor contextual 
cultural demands. I begin with illustrating the pervasiveness of the dual-
sex gender system within sexological literature, particularly the work of 
Stoller (1975, 1985), which cascades down into society at large with force. 
Thus, forcing and augmenting notions of masculinity and femininity as 
binary opposites within our psyche. Following this, I will provide an 
overview of how narcissism has been used theoretically and then offer a 
reconstituted concept of narcissism to understand some Transsexual 
processes in relation to body modifications and trans-gendering. 
The (Trans) Body in a Two-Sex/Gender System 
Since the late 1970s and 1980s Stoller (1975, 1985) and other sexologists 
have utilised psychoanalysis in therapeutic sessions with Transsexuals in 
order to establish the reasons for a person‟s gender identity disorder 
(Flemming & Nathans, 1979). Stoller was by far the most influential 
psychoanalysts who remains often referenced by the main experts in the 
field of Transsexualism, such as John Money (1995) Some of the less well 
known theorists use Stoller‟s work as evidence for their own paradigm 
which holds that sex realignment surgery is unnecessary and could be 
avoided if therapy was offered instead (Rekers & Varni, 1977). 
 Stoller‟s (1975) theory, however, is highly controversial. In a marked 
turn away from Freud‟s theory, Stoller suggests that femininity is the 
“natural” disposition rather than masculinity and it is masculinity that is 
harder to attain. His theory assumes traumatic “family dynamics” in that if 
                                                          
4 I will use the terms transperson/people, transmen (female to male) and 
transwomen (male to female) and Transsexual interchangeably.  
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a male child has too much contact with the mother‟s psyche and physical 
body and too little time is spent with the father, the boy will fail to 
accomplish masculinity. By contrast the female situation: too much time 
spent with the father and too little with the mother will create “family 
dynamics” that will encourage masculinity in girls. Given the Western 
pattern of childrearing, all children would be able to identify more with the 
mother and thus, attain femininity more easily. Furthermore, this theory 
does not take account of other cultural factors such as stories, 
representations, peers, other family members and wider social factors that 
influence and create dynamics that may contribute to a person‟s 
embodiment of masculinity or femininity. More importantly, however, 
male and female sexed bodies are regarded as having an inherently 
coherent relationship to masculinity and femininity in “normal” people. 
Bodies are (medically) ascribed a male or female sex on the basis of a 
“medical gaze” which is based on the morphology of the genitals. From 
this vantage point it is assumed they will have diametrically opposed 
masculine and feminine traits and, thus, gender identities. Accordingly, 
those who feel to be feminine with a male body or masculine with a 
female body are regarded as gender dysphoric rather than body 
dysmorphic, for instance. 
 Nevertheless, masculinity and femininity are not as fixed in Stoller‟s 
view as they were in Freud‟s (1905/1975). Similar to John Money‟s 
(Money & Ehrhardt, 1972) theories of gender identity and gender role, 
Stoller (1985) suggests that masculinity and femininity are a set of beliefs 
of the individual and not an “unquestionable fact”. We all live with 
psychosocial belief systems that enable us to articulate what constitutes a 
man and a woman on a stereotypical level, and to judge whether others 
and our own masculinity and femininity are appropriate. The belief 
systems are a mixture of many elements such as assumptions about 
appropriate sex roles, characteristics of the self, personality attributes and 
cognitive abilities, physique and physical appearance, styles of speech, 
body movement, and sexual behaviour and so on. They are based on how 
we measure up this internal ideal (in psychoanalytic parlance the 
“superego”). Because of these belief systems, Stoller thinks that Gender 
Identity Disorder in children (and presumably in adults, too) can be 
averted by changing their belief system and thus avert them from 
becoming adult Transsexuals. Through “curative” psychotherapeutic 
encouragement boys and girls are said to be able to modify behaviours 
from a Gender Dysphoric state into a personally acceptable state (1985). 
However, I agree with Myra Hird (2003) who suggests in her article A 
Typical Gender Identity Conference? Some Disturbing Reports from the 
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Therapeutic Front Lines, children usually have no psychological or 
cognitive problems that can be ascertained by tests or therapy. Children 
rarely have problems with their performative expressions of gender, and it 
is usually the parents, peers and doctors who have problems with 
“feminine” behaviour in males and “masculine” behaviour in females. 
This is not to say that some of these children are not unhappy but as 
Kitzinger (1997: 72) argues: “these forms of unhappiness are not instances 
of individual pathology. They are perfectly reasonable responses to 
[gender and] sexual oppression”. This view implies that the profound 
conflicts experienced by the child are based on outside pressures, societal 
pressures and familial pressures prior to them attending the Gender 
Identity Clinic (GIC). Issay (1997) argues that it is not the “feminine” or 
“masculine” behavioural traits of children that are problematic but usually 
the parental reproaches. In addition, I would suggest that social and 
medical reproaches aimed at modifying this behaviour is that which 
deleteriously affects the child‟s or adult‟s self-regard. If people believe 
they are acting inappropriately for their gender then they feel that they 
must in fact be the other gender and start to embrace it. 
 This can also be related to adult Transsexuals whose belief systems 
may be more “advanced” or even more ingrained but no less important to 
their sense of self and the society in which they live. Society prescribes 
certain aspects of masculinity and femininity which act both as a restraint 
and a comfort as long as its ideals are “correctly” accomplished and 
produced. Bodies that convey “incorrect” expressions of masculinity or 
femininity can encounter violence or reprimand (Butler, 2004) so that it 
can be argued that transpeople who are working out what is best for their 
ego just the same as anyone else tries to work out their ego stability 
through the process of aligning their belief system with outside notions of 
masculinity and femininity and their bodily representations. 
 Authors in the field of gender dysphoria have stated that psychotherapy 
has made little difference to the outcome of adult Transsexuals‟ Gender 
Dysphoria (Benjamin, 1971; Pauly, 1981). Therefore the emphasis by 
these authors is not placed primarily on the psyche with the intent to 
change the psychic positioning of the ego. Accordingly, to the sociologist 
Brian Tully (1992) it does not matter what the Transsexual personal 
history is and he contends that Transsexuals reach strong and successful 
adult cross-gender status as long as they have the “resourcefulness” 
required. The Transgender literature widely reports that Transsexuals 
employ various avenues in order to research trans-gendering resources 
such as self-help groups, literature and so on (see for example Hausman, 
1995). Following on from this research by the Transsexual hormonal and 
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technological procedures are utilised by Transsexuals in order to be more 
aesthetically congruent with their sense of self, in relation to their 
“masculine” or “feminine” characteristics respectively and their integral 
belief systems. As Milton Diamond suggests  
 
[Transsexuals] solve their problems of reconciling, their disparate sexual 
identity and gender identity, by saying, in essence, “don‟t change my mind; 
change my body. (Diamond, 2000: 50) 
 
Moreover, cross-gender status comes about not because of the label 
medically ascribed - a theoretical error that positions Transsexuals as 
dupes to the medical field (Chiland, 2005; Raymond, 1980) - but because 
of the strong and persistent desire to transform the body and cross-sex 
(Tully, 1992). It is often stated that the Transsexual will incorporate/adopt 
the medical discourse to secure treatment (Hausman, 1995). Yet historical 
work on Transsexualism reveals that the demands for surgical or hormonal 
interventions predates surgical availability and medical etiology 
(Meyerowitz, 2002). This is because it is not a proven condition in the 
sense of a medico-pathological condition but relies on initial self-diagnosis 
in adult Transsexuals due to the imbalance between the ego, body image 
and cultural demands. C. Jacob Hale, a transman and academic, suggests 
that he never felt like the sexological definition of what it was to be 
Transsexual and genital surgery was never an issue for him. He contends 
that what helped him most was to stop asking what he was etiologically 
speaking and to rationally ask “what [bodily] changes do I need to make to 
be a happier person?” (cited in Cromwell, 1999). 
 Griggs (1998) suggests that genital surgery, although important to 
some Transsexuals in relation to self-esteem, is not always a necessary 
intervention to live happily in their preferred gender. Social acceptance by 
others through gender recognition is enough for some Transsexuals which 
can allow a space in which to negotiate their bodies through discursive 
strategies, especially with intimate partners but also more generally in 
society. Furthermore, it is gender attribution and recognition by others and 
the comfortable fit into a societal role that has marked significance for the 
Transsexual subject (Griggs 1998). Transsexual subjectivities are therefore 
self-reflective, intersubjective and interrelational. As Jay Prosser, in his 
book Second Skins asserts: 
 
In the case of transsexuality there are substantive features that its trajectory 
often seeks out […] not only between sexed materiality and gendered 
identification but also assimilation, belonging in the body and in the world. 
(Prosser, 1998: 59) 
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Assimilation of bounded gender identity or belief system of the 
transperson, the morphology of the body that is a part of that belief system 
and the culturally bound ascription of masculine and feminine bodies are 
embraced to form a coherent livable body. 
 While most Transsexuals believe in a binary system of sex/gender - or 
at least accept the binary as an entry point into a dual sex/gender system in 
order to expand upon and create appearances related to (sex) differences 
(Lorber, 1994; Wilton, 2000) - bodily morphology is individually 
constructed through body modification practices and manifested in various 
ways. These manifestations are dependent on variables such as “race”, 
class, sexuality, medical opportunities and interventions, limits of the 
body, financial concerns, length of transition and histories, all of which 
Transsexuals usually reflect upon for a considerable time. Thus, the bodies 
of transpeople are not uniform and the aesthetics of trans-bodies are 
produced, interpreted and negotiated along with a collection of “lived-
through correspondences” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962/2002). 
 So far I suggest that Stoller, the prominent expert applying 
psychoanalytic theory to Transsexualism, has dealt with Transsexual 
embodiment with restraint. While he goes some way in theorising 
masculinity and femininity amenably to contemporary gender theory, as 
sets of belief systems, he begins with the assumption that belief systems 
are based on the oedipal drama and always promote a “normal” person 
which renders those who “fail” gender dysphoric. Stoller further makes 
the mistake that the Transsexual personality is universal and that it is 
purely about genitalia. This paradigm falls short not only because of the 
lack of focus on aspects of body dysmorphia in relation to Transsexualism 
but also by not taking into account other psychosomatic aspects that may 
shed more light on the understandings of other practitioners‟ theories 
working with Transsexuals. Those practitioners‟ theories, who suggest that 
the psyche is not the problem but that the desired alignment of the body to 
the psyche and gender recognition from society is more appropriate , I 
propose in the next section, can be understood by a reformulation of the 
concept of narcissism. 
Reconstituting Narcissism 
The term narcissism was first used by the British sexologist Havelock Ellis 
(1927) in the late 19
th
 century who reviewed the mythological figure 
Narcissus at length. Ellis suggested that someone who had a personality 
type akin to Narcissus was a narcissist and consequently a kind of sexual 
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pervert. The perversion was similar to Freud‟s early expression of 
narcissism as a 
 
person who treats his own body in the same way in which the body of a 
sexual object is ordinarily treated-who looks at it, that is to say, strokes it 
and fondles it till he obtains complete satisfaction through these activities. 
(Freud, 1957: 72) 
 
According to Freud, the narcissistic period of development can be when 
the boundaries between self and objects are not clearly distinct which 
could leave open the age span to incorporate the very young to immature 
adults. Narcissistic people consequently either exclude an object choice 
and refocus their libidinal energy upon the self or choose an object choice 
that resembles them. The assumption is that our libidinal drive to love an 
object outside of ourselves is “normal” and when that process is disrupted, 
either through immaturity or self obsession and the object love 
concentration is on the self, it becomes pathological. 
 In addition to this description Ellis - surprisingly perhaps because of 
his doubts surrounding the usefulness of psychoanalysis - outlined the 
psychoanalytic expansion of the term narcissism as behaviour which does 
not have to be overtly sexual (Pulver, 1986). This analysis was aimed at 
the so-called tendencies of women who absorb, or loose, their sexual 
sensations in self-admiration (Ellis, 1927) which was meant to convey a 
sense of negativity. Theorists such as Rank (1911) added to the perception 
of female narcissism as negative by suggesting that women who love their 
own bodies were applying “normal feminine vanity.” However, this 
concept of narcissism was deployed in the context of a defence 
mechanism, as loving one‟s body was a response against men who could 
not love them and who lacked the ability to understand their beauty and 
value. These theories were influential in attaching certain “feminine” 
superficialities to the concept of narcissism in Western society. 
 Freud‟s (1905/1975) first reference to narcissism in a footnote in the 
Three Essays is in relation to the libidinal development of inverts. For 
Freud (1905/1975), inversion is a semi-natural occurrence which results, 
however, from “normal” inherent bisexuality at the pre-oedipal stage. 
According to Freud, inversion only persists into adulthood if the person 
fails to negotiate the oedipal drama successfully. In other words, correct 
development is achieved through appropriate feminine and masculine 
oedipal attachments with the subject‟s mother and father respectively and 
their subsequent separation from primary (sexual) object choice. Through 
this separation, if all is well, the child will develop into either an 
individuated (separated from and identified with the mother) girl with 
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feminine characteristics and individuated (separated from mother and 
identified with father) boy with masculine characteristics. As the invert‟s 
sexual object choice is similar to him or her he or she is regarded as 
narcissistic. The notion of narcissism is equated alongside with other 
forms of pathology such as sadism, masochism, exhibitionism, vanity and 
self-admiration, thereby firmly locating it in the eclectic field of 
pathologies. 
 Freud abstracted two types of narcissism, primary and secondary. 
Primary narcissism was defined as the “libidinal investment of the self” 
prior to investment in outside objects. Thus, it can be seen as a primeval 
attempt to construct the ego based purely on the life drive‟s love of the 
self. This is in line with Freud‟s notion that the object is not necessarily 
something extraneous in the Three Essays but that it may equally be a part 
of the subject‟s own body. Secondary narcissism occurs at a stage after 
this primary investment when the libidinal investment in objects is 
recoiled due to unpleasurable consequences resulting in a reinvestment of 
the self, again suggesting that appropriate development is only valuable 
through the love of outside objects. This suggests two things: firstly, there 
is no fixed stage at which these investments may occur; instead they can in 
fact occur throughout the life-span dependent on the life-drive‟s capacity 
to continue. In addition, these occurrences may come and go giving the 
impression that narcissism in not fixed within the psyche - we do not have 
a continuous narcissistic personality - but that it is a fluid and 
opportunistic mechanism. More importantly though in this 
conceptualisation is that unpleasurable psychic “injuries” refocus 
consciousness back on the self and provoke a re-evaluation of the self. If 
we are to believe Freud, we need to remember his understanding that the 
  
ego is split between two extremes: a psychical interior, which requires 
continual stabilization, and a corporeal exterior, which remains labile [and] 
open to many meanings. (Grosz, 1994: 43) 
 
The ego, body and meanings must thus be co-dependent. All the aspects of 
narcissism that I have highlighted so far have been situated within 
pathology and are guided by culture‟s demands of the symbolic order of 
femininity and masculinity - what we could now refer to as 
heteronormativity (Warner, 1993). 
 The early association of pathology with narcissism has done enduring 
harm to a concept, especially in lay terms. Judith Butler (1993) asks why 
does this have to be the case? This was also a problem for Freud because 
in Freud‟s later words he states that “we must recognize that self-regard 
has a special intimate dependence on narcissistic libido” (cited in Pulver, 
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1986: 103). I understand Freud to mean that narcissism is an effect of a 
drive that enables the individual to achieve self-regard and thus self-
esteem through the building up of a stable ego. Although a minor theme in 
Freud‟s writing On Narcissism the association with self-esteem has 
become a significant current meaning and we can find it often in the 
psychoanalytic literature used as a synonym for self-esteem (Cooper, 
1986). Freud makes this shift from pathology to a normal developmental 
path clear himself when he states that: 
 
[n]arcissism then in the sense of self-esteem would not be a perversion but 
the libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self preservation. 
(Freud, 1991: 73f emphasis added) 
 
Put more succinctly “a libidinal investment of the self” (1991). 
 Other psychoanalysts have been more assertive and have varying 
views regarding narcissism. The psychoanalyst Kohut (1986) believes that 
the interest in oneself, in terms of body image and psychic successes-the 
mastery required by the ego-is a natural phase of early development. 
Nonetheless, current psychoanalytic discussions underscore narcissism as 
a universal and healthy attribute of personality which is perceived to be 
disordered under particular circumstances (Rose, 2002). The notion of 
disordered narcissism assumes the opposition of positive and negative 
characteristics which are empirically and culturally idealistic. It could be 
argued that these culturally idealistic characteristics contribute to the 
power of the ego-ideal, which embodies boundaries and identifications 
that are part of gendered social structures. Some recent work on narcissism 
makes a distinction between “overt narcissism” and “covert narcissism”. 
Paul Rose (2002), for instance, a psychologist at the State University of 
New York, suggests that “overt narcissism” is beneficial to the individual 
whereas “covert narcissism” has psychological costs to the individual. 
Earlier analysis of these distinctions only emphasise “negative” 
characteristics such as a grandiose sense of self and arrogance for the 
“overt narcissist,” or having a feeling of profound inferiority and 
hypersensitivity for the “covert narcissist “ (Gabbard, 1989). However, 
Rose (2002) suggests that “overt narcissism” correlates positively with 
high self-esteem and negatively with anxiety and depression whereas 
“covert narcissism” correlates positively with anxiety and low-self-esteem 
suggesting that narcissism is a defence against adverse (non-sexual) object 
relations which on some occasions can become overwhelmingly 
disruptive. 
 All approaches to narcissism mentioned are based on a rather 
individualistic sense of self. Although there is a sense that without 
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narcissism there would be no ego, and without an ego there would be no 
self-regard and without self-regard, there would be no self-esteem, all 
these processes are never connected in a clearly intersubjective way. 
Furthermore, I have not explored how the narcissistic drive mechanism 
functions in relation to cultural and personal ideals of masculinity and 
femininity. Thus, we should consider narcissism in relation to (trans) 
people as the intermittent narcissistic drive mechanism that has as its 
measure in an ego ideal that is shaped by personal belief systems and 
gender performativity through the relationship with sociocultural aspects 
of the individual‟s life. This warrants a closer exploration of the insights 
Eric Erikson (1950) has brought to the notion of (narcissistic) self-esteem 
and life-experiences. 
Transsexuals’ Narcissistic Responses 
Erikson (1950) offers a theory about childhood development through 
random coincidental experiences and of physical mastery and 
understandings of their cultural meanings. The process is seen as the 
individual‟s development of a sense of reality from the consciousness 
obtained through the mastering of an experience. The consciousness of the 
individual develops into a defined self within a social reality. Here, self is 
equated with the ego or rather ego-identity (1950), which is built-up 
through narcissistic experiences which could easily be attributed to the 
Transsexual phenomenon. I suggest the Transsexual‟s ego is sporadically 
confronted by the highly customised gender system, belief systems, and 
body, as Transsexuals do not fit with all three as they wish to. When 
relaying memories of childhood, “being different” and ”knowing 
something was wrong” were frequently voiced in the narratives of the 
transpeople interviewed. These specific and widely recognisable 
Transgender discourses were devoid of much explanation at first. Colin 
stated: “[Throughout childhood] I guess I was just trying to figure out 
what it was; there was just something not right at all” (FtM Colin). Not 
offering any indication of why they were “different” or “felt wrong” 
suggests that unacknowledged sense-impressions, experiences, and 
situations gave rise to disidentification with themselves, with their 
prescribed social roles and bodies. The transwomen participants say this 
was most intense in early childhood from the age of 4 and the transmen 
suggested it was most intense during puberty. The feelings, expressed as 
“difference”, offered by most of the respondents become clearer later in 
their accounts when they report feelings of incongruence between their 
sense of self, their body and (socially) ascribed gender role. These 
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processes ultimately lead to a re-orientation from their ascribed gender in 
an attempt to establish an understanding of culturally gendered 
expressions in relation to their bodies. These thought processes and bodily 
orientations then are moving from situations toward a “straightening” of 
thoughts (Ahmed, 2006) and towards securer sensations about their bodies 
and situations. 
 Transpeople often refer back to childhood experiences of cross-
dressing and cross-gender identification which were pleasurable 
experiences. However, in order to avoid persecution for living a prohibited 
lifestyle Transsexuals attempt to pass in their ascribed gender to maintain 
a legitimate position in society. 
 
I just knew there was something wrong. I was cross-dressing in my 
grandmother‟s clothes. I was always more interested in clothes than other 
little boys. I was very envious of my girl cousins and I played with them at 
my grandmother‟s house and was far happier doing that than playing with 
boys. However, I was aware that that is not the way the game is played and 
I conformed. I am by nature a conformist; I am not a rebel. (MtF Jess) 
 
Simultaneously transpeople internalise a stigmatised position which 
intermittently causes them “pain”. Therefore, the mechanism to equilibrate 
the ego and thus self-esteem is required. 
 
It is one of those things that are a great frustration to you, and you know 
that you can not talk to anyone because you know that you just absorb 
social attitudes about boys and girls, and you know that you would be 
ridiculed. (MtF Claire) 
 
This is not a sudden realisation but an ongoing process in which the ego is 
an “inner institution [that has] evolved to safeguard that order within 
individuals on which all outer order depends” (Erikson, 1950: 188). As 
Kohut remarks: 
 
Early narcissistic fantasies […have] not been opposed by sudden 
premature experiences of traumatic disappointment but [have] been 
gradually integrated into the ego‟s reality orientated organization. (Kohut, 
1986: 70) 
 
This problematises Stoller‟s (1985) notion that by working on the trauma 
the person can be “cured” as the ego has been working on and playing 
with these gender configurations for a greater length of time, trying to 
create some kind of order between the ego, body and personal and cultural 
ideas of masculinity and femininity. Ben illustrates this by stating: 
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In terms of really realising around thirteen or fourteen when I was going 
through puberty then it became a very big issue and that is when I started 
to become depressed, but it wasn‟t until I was about sixteen before I started 
seeing a counsellor. I had seen counsellors in my childhood but it wasn‟t 
for that particular thing. So it was a long process in my head, for me, but 
for an outsider it was from about fifteen onwards. I started seeing 
counsellors for that and went to Charing Cross [GIC] at eighteen. (FtM 
Ben) 
 
Erikson‟s (1950) theoretical focus is on child‟s play and how the games 
that are played by children are a function of the ego, in an attempt to 
synchronise the bodily and social processes with the self, however, the 
emphasis on play is arbitrary here. The theory can just as well be 
associated to the ego‟s need to master the various areas of life, and 
especially those areas in which the individual finds his or herself, his or 
her body, and his or her social roles deficient.  
 The disassociation the respondents felt often lessens over time, 
especially after feminisation or masculinising through hormone therapy 
and surgical procedures are undertaken. These interventions change the 
perceptions of the post-transition transpeople‟s discrepancy between their 
own body image and its recognition and acceptance by others in their new 
social and gender roles. Sometimes transpeople talk of a “re-birth” after 
surgery. This “re-birth” often requires the Transsexual to relearn new 
meanings of experiences in their new gender.  
 
So I think that is a renegotiating of the self and the difference between men 
and women isn‟t it? It is to do with women being in touch with their 
biology and the rhythms of the body because of things like menstruation, 
childbirth and masturbation and it‟s a different kind of rhythm. It is more 
about listening, more interactive. If you take that outside the sexual into the 
social and emotional and your identity it is about structuring that process of 
relearning how to please yourself, change what you do. That was really 
influential […] in some ways for me it was not about being soft and soppy 
but it is about learning a different way to be in this [transitioned] body. 
(MtF Jess) 
 
This also requires a rebuilding of their self-esteem through the mastery of 
new experiences in their new gender. This was illustrated by Ben: 
 
I have more confidence each operation I have been through, but basically 
the [phalloplasty] one just gone has given me confidence yet again. When I 
look in the mirror I am a lot happier to see what I see. (FtM Ben) 
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As Erikson (1950) suggests, self-esteem grows to be an assurance that one 
is learning useful steps towards a tangible future. Recently Schrock, Reid 
and Boyd (2005) analysed the “bodywork” transwomen partake in through 
technical and aesthetic means and they suggest that in these cases 
transpeople construct bodies and fashion an image to conform to an ideal 
self which evokes feelings of “authenticity” (Rubin, 2003). Examples of 
these processes are body modification by way of hormones and surgery 
and feminising actions such as the way they walk, talk and dress. There 
are, however, trials and errors with this “bodywork.” This research shows 
how Transsexuals‟ “bodywork” shapes feelings of “authenticity” but can 
also induce more ambiguous feelings in that their bodywork shaped more 
self-monitoring. Schrock et al.‟s analysis took self-monitoring as leading 
to ambiguous feelings due to transwomen sometimes being self-conscious 
about their actions, movements and aesthetic, which left them, feeling 
inauthentic or unnatural. Another report suggests: 
 
Surgical procedures intended to reduce female or male features can reduce 
gender dysphoria, and are not intrinsically problematic (indeed, they are an 
important part of medical treatment for some transgender individuals). 
However, some transgender persons become obsessed with cosmetic 
procedures relating to discomfort with their general body image, 
internalized transphobia, or feelings of not being conventionally 
feminine/masculine, rather than gender dysphoria per se. (Bockting, 
Knudson, & Mira Goldberg, 2006: 30) 
 
Reich (1986: 48) would perhaps describe this as: 
 
The need for narcissistic inflation [which] arises from a striving to 
overcome threats to one‟s bodily intactness […] defences are mobilized 
that permit a permanent conflict solution. 
 
I understand this self-monitoring process as the primary narcissism 
mechanism being activated due to the object of love being unpleasurable, 
remembering that the object of love can be the self. Displeasure or feelings 
of unnaturalness psychically assail the ego resulting in a realisation that 
the body does not fit with the ego and actions do not fit with cultural 
expectations. At which point, and with what Leder (1990) refers to as a 
telic command (tending to a definite end), the narcissistic life-drive is 
activated which Erikson thinks is initiated as a function of the ego in an 
attempt to synchronize the body and ego and social situations and ego. 
 Through retrospective clarification of perceived masculinity and 
femininity, “projects of identity work” (Schrock, Reid, & Boyd, 2005) are 
then played about with as a testing ground for the development of a 
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gendered identity. The results of these perceptions manifest in changing 
style, aesthetics of the body and so forth. As I have argued, the ego is 
intermittently trying to equilibrate itself with outer cultural factors through 
the mechanism of narcissism and we are dependent upon that negotiation. 
In Allan Johnstone‟s (2005) book The Gender Knot he argues that when it 
comes to gender most of us follow the path of least resistance: we “go 
along to get along” allowing our actions to be partly or fully shaped by the 
binary gender system. In this sense, we may or may not agree with the 
gender system, but there are “praxiological constituents,” which we inherit 
and pragmatically adopt in an effort to cope with the exigencies of each 
and every situation (Crossley, 1995). Moreover, it can be discerned from 
sexological literature on Transsexualism that Transsexuals are often 
actually pragmatic people working out what to do with the situations they 
are found to be in. In fact, and somewhat ironically, Transsexuals need to 
be psychologically coherent and stable (not pathological) in order for the 
gender identity disorder “diagnosis” and surgery to be approved at the 
gender clinic. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to reconstitute the concept of narcissism 
as an intermittent and positive mechanism which takes effect when the 
ego, body and personal and cultural ideals of masculinity and femininity 
are at odds. I have applied this concept to try to understand why 
transpeople consider and are sometimes compelled to trans-gender by 
means of hormonal and body modification practices. There is a drive or 
compulsion that sporadically integrates a mechanism when the person 
feels affronted, which I understand as narcissism, in an attempt to align the 
ego with body image and perceived cultural ideals. This situation is 
similar vein to how transmen and transwomen align their cultural ideals, 
body image and ego. This renders the transperson unremarkable in the 
sense that the aesthetic, technological and surgical steps undertaken by the 
transperson is no more pathological than any other person who creates an 
image aesthetically, or alters their body through technology and cosmetic 
procedures. It is simply a psychosomatic attempt to forge the ego, body 
image and perceived cultural demands (which is always contextual) in 
such a way as to have a tangible future. 
 In the work of Erikson (1950) and Rose (2002) we can see narcissism 
as a creative and positive life-drive which at different “stages” can 
encourage a stable ego from which we gain self-esteem. It was my 
intention to argue against the pathologisation of the Transsexual subject 
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and to add to our understanding of the psychosocial complexities of trans-
gendering. My argument highlights the interrelational aspects of the 
Transsexual phenomenon. In so doing, suggest that the problem lies with 
the rigid two-sex system, and the related belief systems of those who 
adhere to it, with its fixed understandings of what masculinity and 
femininity can be. 
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